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 NIRMALYA KUMAR, LISA K. SCHEER, and JAN-BENEDICT E. M. STEENKAMP*
 Channels research has consistently argued that asymmetric channel
 relationships are more dysfunctional than those characterized by
 symmetric interdependence. The authors propose that the degree of both
 interdependence asymmetry and total interdependence affect the level of
 interfirm conflict, trust, and commitment. Using survey data from
 automobile dealers, they demonstrate that, with increasing inter-
 dependence asymmetry, the dealer's trust in and commitment to the
 supplier decline while interfirm conflict increases. In addition, they
 demonstrate that relationships with greater total interdependence exhibit
 higher trust, stronger commitment, and lower conflict than relationships
 with lower interdependence. The effects on conflict are consistent with
 those predicted by bilateral deterrence theory, and the effects on trust and
 commitment are in accord with the authors' bilateral convergence
 predictions.
 The Effects of Perceived Interdependence on
 Dealer Attitudes
 Because marketing channels are sets of interdependent
 organizations involved in the process of making a product
 available to the end-user, dependence is a crucial concept in
 channels research. The pioneering channels work on depen-
 dence examines relationships between one firm's depen-
 dence on its partner, their use of influence strategies, and
 their associated attitudes. Some research (e.g., Brown,
 Lusch, and Muehling 1983; Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989) in-
 dicates that a firm's dependence on its partner increases con-
 flict and the partner's use of coercion, whereas other studies
 report an opposite effect (e.g., Frazier and Rody 1991). In
 keeping with Frazier and Rody's (1991) insight that some
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 contradictory results might be explained by different inter-
 dependence contexts, our study focuses on the effects of per-
 ceived interdependence on channel firm attitudes.
 Recent empirical investigations of interdependence with-
 in channel dyads have incorporated both firms' dependence,
 either from one partner's perspective (e.g., Anderson and
 Narus 1990; Buchanan 1992; Frazier and Rody 1991; Heide
 1994; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990) or by querying
 each partner about its respective dependence (Ganesan
 1994). Anderson and Weitz (1989) provide empirical evi-
 dence supporting Stem and Reve's (1980) proposition that
 channel relationships that are asymmetric in dependence
 and power are more dysfunctional, less stable, and less trust-
 ing than symmetric relationships. However, all symmetric
 relationships are not identical; Buchanan (1992) found that
 increasing total interdependence in symmetric relationships
 enhances performance. It is important to disentangle the ef-
 fects of interdependence asymmetry from total interdepen-
 dence. Consequently, we explore how the dealer's percep-
 tions of (1) interdependence asymmetry and (2) total inter-
 dependence affect the development of interfirm conflict,
 trust, and commitment.
 In the subsequent sections, we discuss the nature of inter-
 dependence. We then present our theory and hypotheses,
 summarize the research methodology, and report our results.
 Finally, we discuss the limitations of our research and the
 implications of our findings.
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 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
 The Nature of Interdependence
 The interdependence structure of a dyadic relationship
 encompasses each firm's dependence, the magnitude of the
 firms' total interdependence, and the degree of interdepen-
 dence asymmetry between the firms. A firm's dependence
 on a partner traditionally has been defined in channels as the
 firm's need to maintain a relationship with the partner to
 achieve its goals (Beier and Stern 1969; Frazier 1983). Al-
 though there are a number of means by which a channel firm
 may become dependent, the firm's inability to replace a
 partner has been considered an indication of the firm's de-
 pendence on its partner (Heide and John 1988). Therefore,
 replaceability of a firm's existing partner is often used as a
 measure of the firm's dependence (Brown, Lusch, and
 Muehling 1983; Buchanan 1992; Frazier and Rody 1991;
 Heide 1994; Heide and John 1988; Phillips 1981).
 Total interdependence is the sum of both firms' depen-
 dence, whereas interdependence asymmetry is the difference
 between the firm's dependence on its partner and the part-
 ner's dependence on the firm (Emerson 1962; Lawler and
 Bacharach 1987). This difference has also been referred to
 as the more dependent firm's relative dependence (Ander-
 son and Narus 1990) or the less dependent partner's relative
 power (Emerson 1962; Frazier and Rody 1991; Lawler and
 Bacharach 1987). Symmetric interdependence exists when
 the firm and its partner are equally dependent on each other.
 Because one firm's dependence on a partner is a source of
 power for that partner (Emerson 1962), total interdepen-
 dence and interdependence asymmetry are equivalent to the
 total power and power asymmetry derived from the firms'
 dependence.
 The Effects of Interdependence on Conflict
 For insight regarding the effect of interdependence on
 conflict, we draw on bilateral deterrence theory (Bacharach
 and Lawler 1981; Lawler, Ford, and Blegen 1988), which is
 a framework that has been applied in a variety of bargaining,
 international relations, and social psychology contexts. Al-
 though this theory was originally concerned only with puni-
 tive power, later extensions of it have incorporated power
 based in dependence (Lawler and Bacharach 1987).
 Bilateral deterrence theory contends that, all else being
 equal, greater total power results in lower conflict
 (Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Lawler and Bacharach 1987;
 Lawler, Ford, and Blegen 1988). A party's desire to engage
 in conflict is asserted to be a function of the party's fear of
 retaliation and expectation of attack. As total interdepen-
 dence increases (holding asymmetry constant), retaliation
 poses an ever-greater threat for both partners. Because each
 fears retaliation and knows that the other harbors similar
 fears, the expectation of being attacked is low. Consequent-
 ly, as total interdependence increases, each becomes less
 likely to instigate conflict. This suppression of conflict is
 based on each firm's dependence on the other; each partner
 possesses sufficient power to seriously damage the other, so
 both will suffer severe losses if a dysfunctional conflict spi-
 ral ensues.
 This commonality of interests is strongest when the rela-
 ment and expression of conflict because the partners have
 equivalent stakes in the relationship. They are equally vul-
 nerable when total interdependence is high or equally mo-
 bile when total interdependence is low. Symmetric relation-
 ships are more stable than asymmetric ones (Anderson and
 Weitz 1989), because asymmetry undermines the balance of
 interests and creates motivations for both firms to engage in
 conflict. Therefore, the degree of asymmetry also must be
 considered.
 Bilateral deterrence theory asserts that, all else being
 equal, increasing interdependence asymmetry is associated
 with higher levels of aggression and conflict by both parties
 (Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Cook and Emerson 1978;
 Lawler, Ford, and Blegen 1988; Molm 1989). As the chan-
 nel interdependence structure becomes more asymmetric,
 the relatively powerful firm has increasingly less motivation
 to avoid conflict; retaliation becomes both less likely and
 less damaging, because the firm can inflict proportionally
 more serious damage on its weaker partner than it would
 suffer in return. Because the relatively dependent partner in-
 creasingly expects to be exploited and/or attacked regardless
 of its own behavior, it is more likely to engage in a preemp-
 tive strike or rebellion against the more powerful firm's
 domination (Lawler, Ford, and Blegen 1988). Thus, bilater-
 al deterrence theory suggests that both the more powerful
 channel firm and its weaker partner are increasingly likely to
 engage in conflict as the relationship becomes more asym-
 metric, albeit for different reasons.
 In summary, when interdependence is high and symmet-
 ric, both firms have much to lose if dysfunctional conflict
 compromises effectiveness or erodes the relationship. Con-
 flict is most likely to be averted or, failing that, resolved
 promptly and constructively in symmetric, highly interde-
 pendent channels. In contrast, firms in asymmetric relation-
 ships have a great deal of motivation to engage in conflict
 and few reasons to restrain themselves. Specifically, we
 hypothesize:
 Hi: All else being equal, as the total interdependence in a chan-
 nel relationship increases, conflict decreases.
 H2: All else being equal, as the interdependence asymmetry in a
 channel relationship increases, conflict increases.
 The Effects of Interdependence on Trust and Commitment
 We also examine the effects of channel interdependence
 on interfirm trust and commitment-sentiments that have
 been identified as critically important in the development of
 long-term channel relationships (e.g., Anderson and Weitz
 1989, 1992; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Kumar, Scheer,
 and Steenkamp 1995; Mohr and Nevin 1990). Although bi-
 lateral deterrence theory offers a rationale for why high and
 symmetric interdependence inhibit the expression of con-
 flict, it offers no insights regarding the development of trust
 and commitment. The absence of conflict permits the devel-
 opment of favorable affective reactions, such as trust and
 commitment, but the absence of conflict does not, in and of
 itself, generate trust and commitment.
 We posit that trust and commitment will emerge when the
 channel is characterized by bilateral convergence, that is,
 when the interdependence structure is such that the interests
 of the channel participants are convergent. Trust and com-
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 mitment are unlikely to exist in minimally interdependent
 relationships because those sentiments are less relevant to
 the functioning of these channels; effective operation is
 grounded, instead, in elements such as short-term explicit
 contracts, transactional product-price competition, and mu-
 tual flexibility in bidding for and switching to alternative
 partners (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987). In contrast, high in-
 terdependence makes it increasingly dangerous for the chan-
 nel partners to engage in opportunistic behavior, negative
 tactics, or coercion, because both have much to lose. Be-
 cause both firms receive valued contributions from each
 other and face relatively high exit barriers, each partner has
 strong motivation to build, maintain, strengthen, and per-
 haps even deepen the relationship. These convergent inter-
 ests make it more likely that the channel partners will per-
 ceive their relationship as a "win-win" opportunity that,
 through cooperation and joint action, will pay handsome
 dividends for both partners.
 Additionally, as a channel becomes more asymmetric, the
 interests of the channel partners diverge. Increasing asym-
 metry in interdependence reduces the structural impedi-
 ments inhibiting the more powerful firm's opportunistic be-
 havior, self-serving exercises of power, and punitive actions.
 The more powerful firm need not cultivate its partner's trust
 or commitment because it can use its relative power to ob-
 tain that partner's compliance or cooperation. The more
 powerful firm, thus, has less need to be cooperative, trusting,
 or committed, and, because trust and commitment rarely
 thrive unless reciprocated (Anderson and Weitz 1992), the
 relatively dependent firm also is unlikely to trust or be com-
 mitted to its partner. Furthermore, trust and commitment are
 risky for the more dependent firm because such sentiments
 render it more vulnerable to its partner's opportunism. As
 the interdependence asymmetry increases, conditions be-
 come more aversive to the development of trust or
 commitment.
 Hence, though high, symmetric interdependence does not
 directly create trust or commitment, it does create an intra-
 channel environment in which trust and commitment can be
 cultivated and flourish because of the convergence of the
 partners' interests. Specifically, we hypothesize:
 H3: All else being equal, as the total interdependence in a chan-
 nel relationship increases, trust and commitment increase.
 H4: All else being equal, as the interdependence asymmetry in a
 channel relationship increases, trust and commitment
 decrease.
 METHOD
 Sample and Data Collection Procedure
 From a commercial list of 2100 new car dealers in two
 states, duplicate listings and those with no contact name
 were deleted, leaving 1640 automobile dealers to whom sur-
 veys with personalized cover letters were mailed. Four
 weeks later, follow-up letters to nonrespondents were sent.
 Questionnaires were received from 453 automobile dealers,
 a response rate of 28%. After questionnaires with excessive
 missing data were eliminated, the final sample consisted of
 417 dealers. Using Armstrong and Overton's (1977) proce-
 early and late respondents for any of our constructs, which
 suggests that nonresponse bias was not a problem.
 Operational Measures
 Interdependence. For both dealer dependence and suppli-
 er dependence, we focused on each firm's replaceability
 within the dealer's trade area (Frazier and Rody 1991).
 Dealer perceptions of their own and their supplier's replace-
 ability have been used previously to measure interdepen-
 dence (e.g., Buchanan 1992; Frazier and Rody 1991; Heide
 1994). For our purposes, measuring the dealer's perception
 of the interdependence structure was consistent with our ex-
 amination of the effects on the dealer's attitudes. The deal-
 er's perception of its own dependence and its supplier's de-
 pendence were each measured using three parallel items
 adapted from Heide and John's (1988) replaceability scale.
 These items capture the opportunity costs of the value that
 would be lost if the relationship ended and the switching
 costs associated with termination and replacement. Supplier
 and dealer dependence were conceptualized as causal indi-
 cators or multidimensional composite indices (Bollen and
 Lennox 1991). Consistent with how causal indicators are in-
 terpreted, we posit that our dependence items affect depen-
 dence rather than the converse. Measures of power or de-
 pendence have often been conceptualized as composite in-
 dices (e.g., Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Frazier and Rody
 1991). Because internal consistency is not applicable to such
 multidimensional composites, "to assess validity we need to
 examine other variables that are effects of the latent con-
 struct" (Bollen and Lennox 1991, p. 312). Support for our
 hypotheses will provide evidence of the validity of our de-
 pendence measures.
 Dealer attitudes. Conflict is behavior that impedes,
 blocks, or frustrates another firm's goal pursuit (Thomas
 1976). The level of current conflict is reflected in cognitive
 and affective aspects. Perceived conflict is the magnitude of
 present conflict acknowledged and perceived by the firm.
 The firm simply recognizes that some active conflict exists,
 which may or may not be manifest and could have originat-
 ed with either partner. Perceived conflict was measured by a
 two-item scale examining the dealer's perception of the de-
 gree of disagreement and conflict between the partners (Fra-
 zier, Gill, and Kale 1989). Hostility reflects the firm's cur-
 rent negative affect toward the partner (Brown, Lusch, and
 Smith 1991; Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989) and may be either
 expressed or repressed, recently formed or retained from a
 previous conflict episode; but whatever its genesis, its exis-
 tence indicates that some level of conflict presently exists
 between the channel partners. Hostility was measured by a
 four-item scale assessing the dealer's anger, frustration, hos-
 tility, and resentment toward the supplier.
 Trust encompasses two essential elements (Deutsch
 1958; Larzelere and Huston 1980; Rempel, Holmes, and
 Zanna 1985): (1) trust in the partner's honesty, that is, the
 belief that the partner stands by its word (Anderson and
 Narus 1990), fulfills promised role obligations, and is sin-
 cere (Dwyer and Oh 1987; Scheer and Stem 1992), and (2)
 trust in the partner's benevolence, that is, the belief that the
 partner is interested in the firm's welfare (Deutsch 1958;
 Larzelere and Huston 1980; Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna
 dure, we found no significant differences (p > .10) between
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 Table 1
 MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND CORRELATIONS
 Dealer Supplier
 Dependence Dependence Conflict Trust Commitment
 Correlations
 Supplier Dependence .054
 Conflict -.127 -.139
 Trust .135 .182 -.755
 Commitment .148 .223 -.637 .756
 Means 4.30 4.13 3.15 4.47 5.45
 Standard Deviations 1.34 1.49 1.32 1.26 .96
 Note: I r | > .0956 are significant at p < .05 for n = 417.
 tively affect the firm (Anderson and Narus 1990). Trust,
 therefore, exists when a firm believes its partner is honest
 and benevolent. Supplier honesty was measured by five
 items assessing the extent to which the supplier was honest,
 truthful, and reliable. A five-item supplier benevolence scale
 captured the dealer's belief that the supplier considers the
 dealer's interests or welfare.
 Definitions and operationalizations of commitment in
 marketing channels have generally encompassed several di-
 mensions, often incorporating affective commitment, expec-
 tation of continuity, and willingness to invest in the relation-
 ship (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Mohr and Nevin 1990). Af-
 fective commitment, namely, the desire to continue a rela-
 tionship because of positive affect toward the partner
 (Meyer and Allen 1984), was measured by three items based
 on the construct definition and scales from organizational
 research. Expectation of continuity incorporates the firm's
 perceptions of both its own and its partner's intent to remain
 in the relationship, which, thereby, reflect the relationship's
 stability. Expectation of continuity was composed of three
 items previously used by Noordewier, John, and Nevin
 (1990) and Anderson and Weitz (1989). Finally, willingness
 to invest reflects a desire to do more than just remain-it is
 an intention to become more deeply involved in the rela-
 tionship through investments of capital and effort. Willing-
 ness to invest was measured by a three-item scale assessing
 a broad range of investment, including capital investment,
 effort devoted to the supplier's line, and willingness to in-
 crease identification with the supplier, each of which, from
 the dealer's perspective, entails a certain amount of risk.
 Measure Validation. LISREL was used to assess the mea-
 surement quality of our dealer attitude constructs because it
 allows a stringent test of convergent and discriminant valid-
 ity (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Consistent with our con-
 ceptualization, conflict, trust, and commitment were speci-
 fied as second-order factors, each of which was reflected in
 its respective first-order factors (i.e., perceived conflict and
 hostility for conflict; partner honesty and benevolence for
 trust; and affective commitment, expectation of continuity,
 and willingness to invest for commitment). Although the
 chi-square (743.81; 265 degrees of freedom) for this model
 was significant (p < .001), the overall fit was acceptable, be-
 cause the Tucker-Lewis Index (.93) and the Comparative Fit
 Index (.92) were above the usually recommended level of
 .90 (Bollen 1989). All first-order and second-order factor
 loadings were significant (minimum t-value was 6.88, p <
 .0001) and greater than .40. The average first-order loading
 was .75, and the average second-ord r loading was .87.
 These findings support the convergent validity of the it ms
 (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Because of the nature of con-
 flict, trust, and commitment, we expected them to be corre-
 lated. Yet, though intercorrelations between the three depen-
 dent variables were high (.64 to .76), they were significant-
 ly below unity (p < .0001), which provides evidence of dis-
 criminant validity. The LISREL based composite reliabili-
 ties for the first-order factors ranged from .67 to .91, where-
 as the composite reliabilities for the second-order factors
 were .91 (trust), .82 (commitment), a d .86 (conflict).
 RESULTS
 For hypothesis te ting, the items were averaged to obtain
 dealer dependence, supplier dependence, and first-order at-
 titude constructs. (See the Appendix for items.) We then cre-
 ated composite scores for conflict, trust, and commitment by
 equally weighting the lower-level constructs, thereby ensur-
 ing that all construct scores would range between one and
 seven. The summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Total
 interdependence (INTERDEP) was constructed by summing
 the dealer depe dence and suppli r dependence scores.
 Asymmetry of interdependence (ASYMTRY) was calculat-
 ed as the absolute value of the difference between dealer and
 supplier d pendence.
 To string ntly test the hypotheses, our analytic l proce-
 dure had to be sensitive to variations in the degree of both
INTERDEP and ASYMTRY. Because regression analysis
 was appropriate, all hypotheses were tested by estimating
 the subsequent regression equa ion for each of the thre  de-
 pendent variables (conflict, trust, and commitment).
 y = bo + bl INTERDEP + b2 ASYMTRY
 Results are summarized in Table 2.
 Our results indicate support for all four hypotheses. All
 else being equal, conflict is greater when INTERDEP is
 lower (HI) and when ASYMTRY is higher (H2). Similarly,
 all else being equal, trust and commitment are higher when
 INTERDEP is greater (H3) and when ASYMTRY is lower
 (H4). Increasing INTERDEP positively affects dealer atti-
 tudes, whereas increasing ASYMTRY negatively affects
 dealer attitudes.
 Bilateral deterrence theory and our notion of bilateral
 convergence both predict that the relatively powerful firm
 and its relatively dependent partner each will be affected
 similarly by ASYMTRY (Lawler and Bacharach 1987). Our
 results verify that increasing ASYMTRY is associated with
 351
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 greater conflict, lower trust, and lower commitment, without
 regard to the dealer's relatively dependent or powerful posi-
 tion. We conducted an additional analysis to examine the
 implicit presumption that the asymmetry effect holds true
 regardless of the direction of ASYMTRY.
 We tested whether the effect of ASYMTRY on the three
 dealer attitude variables differed between relatively power-
 ful and relatively dependent dealers by using a spline re-
 gression analysis (Johnston 1984). For the purposes of this
 analysis, two dummy variables were created to classify
 asymmetric relationships as "Dealer Relative Dependence"
 (dealer dependence > supplier dependence), "Dealer Rela-
 tive Power" (supplier dependence > dealer dependence), or
 neither. Two hundred and eleven dealers reported that they
 were relatively dependent on the supplier, whereas 183 deal-
 ers indicated they were relatively powerful (23 relationships
 were rated perfectly symmetric).
 Two new variables were created by multiplying
 ASYMTRY by the two dummy variables. Subsequently,
 each of the three dealer attitude constructs was regressed on
 INTERDEP, ASYMTRY*Dealer Relative Dependence, and
 ASYMTRY*Dealer Relative Power. Conducting this spline
 analysis essentially splits the effects of ASYMTRY to ex-
 amine whether its slope differs significantly between when
 the dealer is relatively dependent versus when the dealer is
 relatively powerful. Tests for each of the three dependent
 variables revealed no significant differences (p > .05) be-
 tween the regression coefficients for ASYMTRY among rel-
 atively powerful dealers and relatively dependent dealers.
 For example, for trust, the regression coefficients for
 ASYMTRY*Dealer Relative Dependence and ASYMTRY*
 Dealer Relative Power were -.144 and -.138 (t = -.10, n.s.),
 respectively. Regardless of whether the dealer is in a posi-
 tion of relative power or relative dependence, increasing
 ASYMTRY and decreasing INTERDEP generate greater
 conflict, lower trust, and lower commitment.
 An alternate analysis similarly supported the view that
 conflict, trust, and commitment did not differ between rela-
 tionships in which dealers saw themselves as relatively pow-
 erful from those in which they were relatively dependent.
 For the purposes of this analysis, each relationship was as-
 signed to one of four cells: low symmetric interdependence,
 Table 2
 REGRESSION RESULTSa
 Dependent Variables
 Independent
 variables Conflict Trust Commitment
 INTERDEP -.114** .130** .117**
 (.031) (.029) (.022)
 ASYMTRY .094* -.141** -.073*
 (.053) (.050) (.038)
 Constant 3.964** 3.592** 4.575**
 (.286) (.270) (.204)
 R-Square .04 .07 .08
 F Test (2,414) 8.82** 14.69** 16.76**
 aStandard Errors in Parentheses.
 **p < .001, one-tailed test.
 *p < .05, one-tailed test.
 dealer relative dependence, dealer relative power, and high
 symmetric interdependence. There were no significant dif-
 ferences on conflict, trust, or commitment among the first
 three cells. The high symmetric cell, however, consistently
 demonstrated more positive attitudes, because only in this
 cell do relationships benefit from both greater INTERDEP
 and low ASYMTRY. In the low asymmetry cell, the benefits
 of symmetry are offset by the low level of interdependence.
 Under either dealer relative dependence or dealer relative
 power, the benefits of greater interdependence are offset by
 greater asymmetry.
 Finally, because there is no unanimity of opinion regard-
 ing how dependence should be measured, we included two
 alternative dependence measures in our study. The first mea-
 sure was a single item global assessment of dependence
 ("how dependent is your dealership on this supplier" and
 "how dependent is the supplier on your dealership"). The re-
 gression coefficients for INTERDEP and ASYMTRY were,
 respectively, -.054 and .090 for conflict; .128 and -.161 for
 trust; and .094 and -.068 for commitment. All coefficients
 were significant at the .01 level, except for the effect of IN-
 TERDEP on conflict, which was significant at the .10 level.
 The second measure of dependence combined our origi-
 nal replaceability operationalization measure with a three-
 item assessment of motivational investment, which per-
 tained to the importance of the relationship, as well as the
 percentage of sales and profits contributed. The regression
 coefficients for INTERDEP and ASYMTRY were, respec-
 tively, -.178 and .117 for conflict; .235 and -. 187 for trust;
 and .205 and -.087 for commitment. All coefficients were
 significant at the .05 level, except for the effect of
 ASYMTRY on conflict, which was significant at the .10
 level.
 Thus, repeating our analysis with these alternate opera-
 tionalizations, we find that our results are not unique to our
 specific measure of dependence. We find the same pattern of
 results for all four hypotheses, regardless of which measure
 of dependence we use. Therefore, we conclude that our re-
 sults are robust across a variety of dependence
 operationalizations.
 DISCUSSION
 Previously, Buchanan (1992) as well as Heide and John
 (1988) had demonstrated that high mutual dependence en-
 hances performance. In addition, Anderson and Weitz
 (1989) offered evidence that channel relationships charac-
 terized by power asymmetry generate lower trust and conti-
 nuity than those characterized by symmetry. There was,
 however, no isolation of the effects of asymmetry from those
 of total interdependence on relationship quality. Could the
 apparent effects of asymmetry be caused by lower total in-
 terdependence? Our results indicate that both decreasing
 asymmetry and increasing total interdependence have posi-
 tive effects on relationship quality.
 Limitations
 Several potential limitations of this study should be noted.
 We examined dealer perceptions of the supplier's depen-
 dence in the local trade area, specifically, the extent to which
 the supplier could replace the dealer in that market (Frazier
 and Rody 1991). Although we believe this approach is ap-
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 propriate for our examination of the effects of interdepen-
 dence on dealer attitudes, the supplier's dependence could
 be assessed at other levels. For example, any single dealer
 could be "replaced" by sales generated in other trade areas
 or other divisions in the supplier's operations. Conversations
 with automobile dealers led us to believe, however, that
 trade areas are relevant to the participants in this industry
 and dealers have clear opinions about their replaceability.
 We demonstrate that, as far as automobile dealer perceptions
 of replaceability are concerned, there are many relationships
 in which the dealer is less dependent than the manufacturer.
 Furthermore, the results remain unchanged for a global mea-
 sure of dependence that does not rely on "trade areas."
 Nonetheless, further research should examine the effects of
 interdependence in different contexts.
 A second potential limitation is that we collected data
 from only one side of the dyad. To what extent dealer's and
 supplier's perceptions of supplier dependence would have
 converged is unknown. It is reasonable to expect that in an
 ongoing relationship the partners' perceptions regarding
 their interdependence would become more accurate over
 time. Because the partners' perceptions about the interde-
 pendence structure affect their actions, incorrect perceptions
 would be adjusted as one partner's perceived power proved
 ephemeral and the other behaved in ways incongruous with
 the faulty perceptions. Whereas Heide (1994) observed a
 significant correlation (.40) between measures obtained
 from the dealer and supplier sides of the dyad, Buchanan
 (1992) did not. Although using dealer perceptions of inter-
 dependence is consistent with our dependent variables and
 previous research (Anderson and Narus 1990; Anderson and
 Weitz 1989; Buchanan 1992; Frazier and Rody 1991; Heide
 1994; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990), additional in-
 sight could be gained from exploring dyadic data, because
 models from one side of the dyad often do not replicate on
 data from the other side (for examples, see Anderson and
 Narus 1990; Anderson and Weitz 1992; Ganesan 1994).
 Dependence has been measured in a variety of ways, in-
 cluding replaceability, role performance (e.g., Frazier 1983),
 and concentration of exchange (e.g., Heide and John 1988).
 This variety in measurement is probably responsible for
 some of the contradictory findings in previous channels re-
 search. To more accurately measure dependence, perhaps
 further research could investigate more extensively other op-
 erationalizations of dependence by encompassing the vari-
 ous aspects of dependence that have been noted by Emerson
 (1962) and previous channel researchers.
 Although the variance explained here by the two interde-
 pendence constructs is significant, it is still relatively small.
 This suggests that additional antecedents are needed to fully
 explain the development of conflict, trust, and commitment.
 Apparently, firms are affected by the interdependence struc-
 ture, but not imprisoned by it, a theme on which we elabo-
 rate subsequently.
 Finally, our study used single informants, though the use
 of multiple informants is a more rigorous data collection
 procedure (Kumar, Stern, and Anderson 1993; Phillips
 Theoretical Implications
 Our results suggest that the effects of a focal firm's de-
 pendence on conflict, trust, and commitment are contingent
 on the level of its partner's dependence on the focal firm.
 Rather than considering only one firm's dependence, we
 agree with Anderson and Narus (1990, p. 43), who state that
 "the firm's perception of its dependence relative to its part-
 ner's dependence on the relationship is a construct of greater
 interest in channels research." We hasten to add, however,
 that relative dependence also is only part of the picture, be-
 cause the same degree of asymmetry can have vastly differ-
 ent ramifications depending on the total interdependence in
 the relationship. A comprehensive view of interdependence
 must encompass both asymmetry and magnitude of
 interdependence.
 The magnitude and asymmetry of interdependence de-
 scribe the sociopolitical structure (Cook and Emerson 1978;
 Lawler 1992; Stern and Reve 1980) of a channel relation-
 ship. Certain interdependence structures tend to promote the
 development of trust and commitment and inhibit the out-
 break of conflict, regardless of the specific firms involved.
 Nevertheless, the interplay between channel firms is not dic-
 tated by their interdependence. Rather, the underlying inter-
 dependence structure defines the boundaries of the field on
 which specific firms interact and provides a center of gravi-
 ty around which individualistic behavior occurs. The specif-
 ic channel firms inhabiting these structures perceive and in-
 terpret their relative positions and then act as they see fit
 (Lawler 1992). What is most intriguing about our findings is
 that an observer, knowing nothing about the particular his-
 tory of the channel relationship, the orientation or identity of
 the partners, or the actions each firm has recently taken, can
 make some general, baseline predictions about the nature of
 that relationship by simply using knowledge of the partners'
 interdependence. The dynamics of the partners' interdepen-
 dence will either put their interests in conflict or create con-
 ditions under which trust and commitment can develop.
 The interdependence structure generates the basic under-
 lying inclinations, but channel firms are only affected by the
 interdependence structure, not imprisoned by it. Firms in
 identical positions may behave very differently as a result of
 their unique characteristics, histories, objectives, strategies,
 and tactics. High, symmetric interdependence is no guaran-
 tee that a trusting, committed relationship will develop, just
 as interdependence asymmetry does not irrevocably con-
 demn the partners to ruinous conflict. An interdependence
 structure conducive to conflict, for example, may not result
 in conflict if the channel partners seek to bridge differences
 and find common ground rather than exercise their abilities
 to intimidate or coerce (Lawler 1992). Nevertheless, trust
 and commitment do not naturally flourish in asymmetric re-
 lationships; if they are to develop, they must be carefully
 cultivated.
 Additional research needs to explore the extent to which
 firm behaviors, such as risk-taking, making credible com-
 mitments, relationship-building activities, and the use of
 power or influence, are affected by the interdependence
 structure. The dominant firm in a unilateral governance
 structure may work purposely with its more dependent part-
 1981).
 353
 ner to craft a more "equal" relationship with a bilateral gov-
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Fri, 18 Aug 2017 02:48:13 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, AUGUST 1995
 ernance structure. If an asymmetric relationship is to be-
 come more stable, the more powerful firm must take the first
 steps by refraining from using its power in a negative or self-
 serving fashion and, instead, treat the partner fairly, invest in
 relationship-specific assets, or undertake other relationship-
 building activities (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995).
 Although bilateral deterrence theory has proven relevant
 for dependence-based power in the channel context we ex-
 amined, it may be less relevant in other contexts. Relation-
 ships with high interdependence have the potential to be de-
 structive if an incident undermines bilateral deterrence and
 ignites dysfunctional conflict behavior. Although our find-
 ings support bilateral deterrence, further research should ex-
 amine whether bilateral deterrence theory holds when, for
 example, power is based on coercive capability or when
 channel partners perceive a "win-lose" situation.
 Managerial Implications
 Channel relationships with high symmetric dependence
 are likely to generate benefits, such as more favorable per-
 formance, for both partners (Buchanan 1992; Heide and
 John 1988). A separate post hoc analysis of the 23 perfectly
 symmetric relationships in our sample reveals that the bene-
 ficial effects of greater total interdependence were signifi-
 cant for trust, commitment, and conflict, despite there being
 a small number of these symmetric relationships. Although
 perfect symmetry is elusive and rarely achieved, reducing
 asymmetry is a more realistic goal. Emerson (1972) sug-
 gests that a vulnerable firm in an asymmetric relationship
 may consider four paths to a more balanced relationship.
 The firm may reduce its own dependence by increasing al-
 ternatives available or by decreasing the value of its rela-
 tionship with the partner. Alternatively, a firm may strive to
 increase its partner's dependence by increasing its value to
 the partner or by reducing the partner's alternatives.
 Our research suggests that, all else being equal, relatively
 dependent firms should work to increase their partner's de-
 pendence rather than strive for autonomy and reduce their
 own dependence. Although reducing relative dependence
 will reduce asymmetry, it also has the detrimental side-ef-
 fect of lowering the level of total interdependence, thereby,
 eroding relational cohesion (Emerson 1972). In contrast, in-
 creasing a firm's value to the partner increases the partner's
 dependence, moves the asymmetric relationship toward
 symmetry, and concurrently raises the level of interdepen-
 dence, thus, enhancing cohesion. Our results support Lawler
 and Bacharach's (1987) contention that the positive effects
 of increasing total interdependence are not limited solely to
 symmetric relationships. Rather, greater total interdepen-
 dence promotes higher trust, greater commitment, and lower
 conflict, even in asymmetric relationships.
 Further research is needed to clarify the trade-offs between
 total interdependence and asymmetry of interdependence. In
 some contexts, the effect of increasing total interdependence
 sometimes may outweigh the effect of reducing asymmetry.
 Thus, it may be preferable to tolerate a position of relative
 dependence in a highly interdependent relationship than set-
 tle for a lower degree of interdependence in a determined
 quest for symmetry. Perhaps, rather than jockeying for posi-
 tions of relative power in relationships, firms should empha-
 size increasing the unique value-added they generate for each
 other. Highly interdependent relationships are more likely to
 endure and be the basis of sustainable competitive advan-
 tage, even if some level of asymmetry persists.
 Appendix
 MEASURESa
 Supplier Dependence
 1. In our trade area, there are other firms that could provide the
 supplier with comparable distribution.
 2. In our trade area, the supplier would incur minimal costs in re-
 placing our firm with another dealer.
 3. It would be difficult for the supplier to replace the sales and
 profits our dealership generates.
 Dealer Dependence
 1. There are other suppliers who could provide us with compa-
 rable product lines.
 2. Our total costs of switching to a competing manufacturer's
 line would be prohibitive.
 3. It would be difficult for our firm to replace the sales and prof-
 its generated from this supplier's line.
 Conflict
 Hostility.
 When your firm reflects on the relationship with the sup-
 plier, does your firm feel:b
 1. anger
 2. frustration
 3. resentment
 4. hostility
 Perceived conflict.
 1. A high degree of conflict exists between the supplier and our
 firmn.
 2. The supplier and our firm have major disagreements on cer-
 tain key issues.
 Trust
 Trust in partner's honesty.
 1. Even when the supplier gives us a rather unlikely explanation,
 we are confident that it is telling the truth.
 2. The supplier has often provided us information that has later
 proven to be inaccurate. (R)c
 3. The supplier usually keeps the promises that it makes to our
 firm.
 4. Whenever the supplier gives us advice on our business opera-
 tions, we know that it is sharing its best judgment.
 5. Our organization can count on the supplier to be sincere.
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 Perceived Interdependence
 Trust in partner's benevolence.
 1. Though circumstances change, we believe that the supplier
 will be ready and willing to offer us assistance and support.
 2. When making important decisions, the supplier is concerned
 about our welfare.
 3. When we share our problems with the supplier, we know that
 it will respond with understanding.
 4. In the future, we can count on the supplier to consider how its
 decisions and actions will affect us.
 5. When it comes to things that are important to us, we can de-
 pend on the supplier's support.
 Commitment
 Affective commitment.
 1. Even if we could, we would not drop the supplier because we
 like being associated with it.
 2. We want to remain a member of the supplier's network be-
 cause we genuinely enjoy our relationship with it.
 3. Our positive feelings towards the supplier are a major reason
 we continue working with it.
 Expectation of continuity.
 1. We expect our relationship with the supplier to continue for a
 long time.
 2. The renewal of our relationship with the supplier is virtually
 automatic.
 3. It is unlikely that our firm will still be doing business with this
 supplier in two years. (R)
 Willingness to invest.
 1. If the supplier requested it, we would be willing to make fur-
 ther investment in supporting the supplier's line.
 2. We are willing to put more effort and investment in building
 our business in the supplier's product.
 3. In the future we will work to link our firm with the supplier's
 in the customer's mind.
 aAll scales are 7-point scales, with "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree" as the anchors, unless noted otherwise.
 bThese are 5-point scales with "strongly feels this way" and "does not feel this way" as the anchors.
 cltems marked (R) are reverse scaled.
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